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Ensuring that space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes is one of the
most important contributions which international law can make to the safe
and orderly existence of all nations. Through the work of the United Nation's
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, five significant treaties have
emerged which pertain to certain activities of signatory states in outer space.
Several international organizations exist, such as the International Telecom-
munication Union and the International Institute of Space Law, which con-
tribute to the peaceful utilization of space resources by promoting an accept-
able legal framework.
While acknowledging the important effect of international law upon
spacefaring, it must be borne in mind that other factors beyond the realm of in-
ternational law strongly influence national space operations. This is especially
true in the more competitive and secretive area of military space activities. In-
ternational law is but one element in an overall combination of factors which
ultimately will determine the extent to which space is further used for military
purposes. By placing the role of international law in proper perspective, a more
realistic and useful debate as to the current issues of space militarization and
weaponization may result.
An interdisciplinary framework in which international law is but one ele-
ment is presented in this article in the hope of lending organization to the com-
plex subject of space weaponization. Seven factors are discussed which strong-
ly influence decision-makers in both the United States and the Soviet Union
who are charged with establishing and implementing the military space
policies of their respective nations. They are (1) the relationship between the
militarization of earth and the militarization of space; (2) the effects of weapon
technology and national defense policy upon the use of space; (3) the interrela-
tionship of the international law-making process with national space objec-
tives; (4) the influence of the press and public opinion upon the military space
debate; (5) problems inherent with outer space arms control treaties and provi-
sions; (6) the danger of relying upon false analogies in debating issues of
spaceborne weaponry; and (7) the tendency to treat arms control and disarma-
*This article is based on a paper submitted to the 1985 International Institute of Space Law Colloquium on
the Law of Outer Space.
"Attorney, Fitzgerald, Abbott & Beardsley, Oakland, California; A.B., University of Southern California;
M.B.A., University of North Dakota; J.D., University of California Hastings College of Law; Member of
the California Bar.
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ment as the only available means to bring about peace.
This proposed framework then will be applied to help identify and analyze
important elements of the debate surrounding the United States' Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) program. SDI presently is the most debated issue in
the field of military space operations. The application of an interdisciplinary
approach which considers international law, technology, national defense
policy and strategy, and the role of public opinion offers a practical and
organized manner in which to debate the value and effects of on-going
research efforts concerning a spaceborne ballistic missile defense system.
II. ELEMENTS AFFECTING THE MILITARIZATION AND WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE
Militarization of Space is Tied Inextricably to the Militarization of Earth.
There is an inherent danger in thinking in terms of "space warfare" and
"earthbound warfare"; for it properly can be argued that there is only warfare.
Separating a theatre of combat into discrete legal regimes may aid scholarly
analysis, but it fails to reflect important practical considerations. For example,
battlefield commanders continually strive for the most expeditious means to
employ force against an opponent, and this traditionally has equated to "tak-
ing the high ground." Consequently, it must be realized that in seeking to ban
weapons from space, the international law-makers are demanding of the
generals that they sacrifice their most tactically advantageous position
available; for on today's battlefield, space is the high ground.'
Essential command, control, communication and intelligence functions
presently are accomplished through the use of military satellites. Other
military uses of space include navigation, missile detection and tracking, and
meteorology (including target site weather forecasting).2 These are all func-
tions which can best, or only, be performed from space and it is no great jump
in logic to assume that weapons delivery also can be done best from space. This
raises a point that has been made by other authors; that a clear distinction
should be made between the militarization of space and the weaponization of
space.3 Some reasons for making this distinction include (1) space already is
very militarized, but less weaponized; (2) treaty language heretofore has
reflected this distinction;4 and (3) some militarization of space actually is
ID. GRAHAM. High Frontier (1983); Smith, Legal Implications of a Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense, 15
CAL. W. INTL. L.J. 52,53-54 (1985) thereinafter cited as Smith]; butseeT. KARAS, THE NEW HIGH GROUND
201-02 (1983) [hereinafter cited as KARAS], which argues that space is the new military high ground only in a
limited sense because neither superpower can "seize and hold" space as a strategic territory.
'G.H. STINE, CONFRONTATION IN SPACE 11-24 (198 1); Reed & Norris, Military Use of the Space Shuttle, 13
AKRON L. REV. 665, 666-70 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Reed & Norris].
'See, e.g., He Qizhi, On Strengthening Legal Measures for Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 354 (1985).
'Some treaties have demilitarized specific geographical regions, some treaties have deweaponized regions,
and some do neither. For example, the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,
420 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force June 23, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Antarctic Treaty) provides for the
[Vol. 19:3
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desirable. As to this last point, it long has been recognized that early warning
satellites extend the time in which a nation can assess an incoming missile at-
tack, and more importantly for maintaining the peace, resolve a miscalculation
based on human or machine error. Another example is reconnaissance
satellites, which give nations some degree of confidence that arms control
treaties are being observed by other signatories.'
As the military high ground, space should be thought of as a geographic
place and not merely a legal regime governed by vague concepts such as "com-
mon heritage of mankind."6 The edge of space is a national border, while space
itself encompasses essential lines of communication and transportation. Space
also holds vast natural resources. These factors combine to pressure spacefar-
ing nations into increasing their military presence in space, just as the United
States and the Soviet Union seek to protect their ocean space access and assets
by establishing a 600-ship navy and a worldwide/"blue water" presence respec-
tively. In future space arms discussions, a fundamental objective for partici-
pants will be to ensure continued free use of and access to national space re-
sources. A second major factor will be to ensure that national space borders
are adequately protected, so that space is not used as a conduit for offensive
weapons. These issues will assume paramount importance when any proposal
is made to ban some specific weapon system from space. No nation can be ex-
pected to bargain away the ability to defend itself from attack in and from
space.
Considerations of Weapon Technology and Defense Strategy in the Weapon-
ization of Space Debate.
There appears to be a close "cause-effect" relationship between arms con-
trol treaties and technological limitations. What is less certain is whether
treaties limit arms technology or, conversely, whether limited technological ca-
pability in some areas makes possible a treaty. For example, while one view
complete demilitarization of that continent in Article i, Paragraph 1: "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful
purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establish-
ment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any
type of weapons."
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty] partially
deweaponizes earth orbit in Article IV, which provides: "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place
in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other
manner." Of course, the strategic high seas are not deweaponized or demilitarized. See infra note 22.
'Christol, The Common Interest in the Exploration, Use and Exploitation of Outer Space for Peaceful Pur-
poses: The Soviet-American Dilemma, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 281, 283 (1985); Kotlyarov, Soviet Proposals on Banning Outer Space Militarization: Ade-
quacy of Verification Measures to the Scope of Commitments, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH COL-
LOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 341 (1985).
'For a discussion of the distinction between "space as a place" and "space as a legal regime" see Glazer,
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holds that the Antiballistic Missile Treaty7 (ABM Treaty) limited ABM tech-
nology and prevented a defensive arms race, a converse argument is that the
ABM treaty came into existence only because existing ABM technology at
that time was inadequate to justify deployment of the system. This created the
potential for a highly visible, but substantively lacking, gesture of superpower
arms control agreement. Supporting this latter view is the fact that the United
States chose to not even build the two systems (later one) permitted it by the
treaty and subsequent protocol.8 Likewise, one major reason that an antisatel-
lite weapon (ASAT) treaty never came to pass was that the United States had
yet to test its ASAT system, whereas the Soviet Union was well into the opera-
tional testing stage.9 As a result, the United States refused to codify the techno-
logical imbalance of the moment. The expired SALT I (Interim Agreement)
and the unratified SALT II, however, are examples which demonstrate some
actual limitations of technological development". The point is that arms con-
trol treaties often are shaped by the existing state of technology. Technology is
not always limited by arms control treaties. Therefore, any space arms control
treaty will be effected greatly by the existing state of technology in such areas
of ASAT and SDI. A clean slate no longer exists in space.
Post-World War 11 strategic arms control treaties have conformed to the
doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The theory of MAD is that
neither superpower can launch a nuclear attack upon the other and expect to
survive the inevitable counterstrike. MAD is dependent upon deterrence, and
agreements such as the SALT I Interim Agreement, the ABM Treaty and
SALT II have sought to preserve and protect the existing balance of terror.
This is best demonstrated by the ABM Treaty in which it is agreed, in effect,
that it is destabilizing to defend oneself. The reasoning is that a defensive
system denies an opponent the ability to retaliate. Such a situation would give
an aggressor a preemptive first-strike capability, for it can launch an attack and
defend against the counterattack. Hence, destruction would not be mutual,
nor assured. Any future arms control treaty must either respect the tenets of
MAD or provide a suitable alternative to this doctrine. It must enhance deter-
rence and/or ensure that an effective defensive capability exists. This can be
done from space just as it can be done from the ground. The question becomes
'Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T.
3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (effective Oct. 3, 1972), Protocol to Treaty, on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, United States-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276 (entered into force
May 24, 1976). The term ballistic missile defense (BMD) appears to have superseded ABM as the more ap-
propriate jargon in recent years.
8Smith, supra note I, at 59 & n.4l.
'KARAS, supra note 1, at 172-73.
'1The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972)
has expired. SALT 11 negotiations led to an agreement signed by President Carter and General Secretary
Brezhnev on June 18, 1979. Although the United States Senate has not ratified this agreement, both parties
generally abide by its provisions.
[Vol. 19:3
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which situs is more efficient and reliable.
International Legal Efforts as a Means of Implementing National Policy.
One facade pertaining to arms control treaties which should be dispelled
promptly is the belief that proposals for arms control treaties and efforts at in-
terpretations by the superpowers are based always on objective applications of
international law and custom. Instead, international law often is used as a na-
tional policy tool. Delegates from both superpowers too often cloak na-
tionalistic positions with selfserving references to documents such as the
United Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty." This is best evidenced
by the rhetoric surrounding the East-West split on issues such as the aborted
ASAT treaty and the military characterization of the Space Shuttle.
It seems logical that if all nations objectively applied international legal
principles, there would be no bloc voting pitting East against West on key
issues concerning the militarization and weaponization of space. Bloc voting
results from political and military posturing, not unbiased application of legal
principles. Future negotiators, therefore, should guard carefully against situa-
tions in which various charters, treaties and customs are invoked as justifica-
tion for advancing a nationalistic objective.
Influences of Press and Public Opinion Upon Arms Control Decision-Making
and Treaties.
Of the seven factors discussed in this article which affect arms treaties,
perhaps the one which is most unbalanced and most exploited by one super-
power to the detriment of the other is the power of the press and public opinion
upon national decision-making. The United States and the Soviet Union are at
opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of governmental use and regulation of
the press. In the Soviet Union, public opinion virtually has no impact upon
government decision-making, especially in an area critical to national security
such as space weaponization. Decisions generally are reached behind closed
doors and the result is communicated from a (seemingly) unified front. This is
not to say that disagreement does not occur, but that such arguments are not
"See Russell, Military Activities in Outer Space: Soviet Legal Views. 25 HARV. INrL. L.J. 153, 164-65 & nn.
77-84 (1984):
In the Soviet view, international law cannot be divorced from the class struggle. In Marxist terms, in-
ternational relations are part of the superstructure of society, and relations between states with dif-
ferent social systems constitute class relations. In this ideological context, the Soviets unabashedly
place international law in the service of the Soviet state. Since law represents a class phenomenon, it
becomes a weapon in the ongoing struggle for world socialism.
Id. at 164.
The Soviets, however, properly point out that they do not have a monopoly on the nationalistic use of in-
ternational law. Soviet author V.S. Vereshchetin, in criticizing an earlier article by American author Dr.
Harry Almond, states that Dr. Almond "'gives these absolutely clear and unambiguous provisions of the UN
Charter his own interpretation erasing their legal content, their unconditionally binding character for
states." Vereshchetin, Against the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Outer Space. PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 358, 359 (1985).
Winter, 19861
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conducted in full public view.
The same is not the case in the United States. Weapon systems often are
authorized and funded by the slimmest margin of congressional votes. The pol-
icy views of all legislators are available to those who care to know and tremen-
dous public pressure often is brought to bear upon key "swing votes" hoping to
influence the future course of United States strategic policy and hardware.
The openness of United States society presents an exploitation opportuni-
ty to the Soviet Union, whereas the United States has little direct access to the
Soviet state-controlled media or general public. As a result, arms control
negotiations generally are accompanied by Soviet attempts to influence the
United States and Western Europe press and public in hopes of softening
United States negotiating resolve and support at home. 2 Of course, the United
States can and does respond by presenting the Administration position in the
Western press, but is rarely allowed to use Soviet media. A distinct imbalance
results in the "media theater"'3 which accompanies arms control negotiations;
and participants from the two superpowers come to the bargaining table on
vastly different footing. It should be noted, however, that the media sparring
was temporarily suspended during the Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva Summit of
1985, during which the militarization of space was discussed in detail.
An additional point concerning public opinion in the area of strategic
weapons systems is that today's debate deals with yesterday's technology.
Since much military research is classified, there is a significant lagtime between
developing a certain capability and reporting it to the general public. Conse-
quently, it is risky to state emphatically that some specific military technolog-
ical feat is beyond a nation's capability merely because it has not been made
public. Those who are closest to space weapons projects are the same people
bound by their security clearances not to discuss research breakthroughs.
Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Arms Control Treaties.
This factor is one of the most analyzed, debated and written about of the
seven considered. Questions such as what is a weapon?; what is a weapon of
mass destruction?; and what are peaceful uses?; can swallow up entire con-
ferences and colloquia. Unfortunately, the answers rarely become any clearer,
notwithstanding the amount of time and effort spent in seeking these elusive
solutions. Professor Gorove identified this problem in a panel discussion spon-
sored by the Association of United States Members of the International In-
"The Information Department of the USSR Embassy has purchased space in United States newspapers to
promote Soviet views. See, e.g., What Holds Back Progress at Geneva Talks?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1985, at
A-15, col. 1.
13Acknowledgement goes to Professor Christol for helping to popularize the term "media theater." See
Christol, supra note 5, at 287-88. For the purposes of this paper, media theater describes the well-orchestrat-
ed press and public opinion blitz associated with arms control issues. This media theater, however, only oc-
curs in the Western press and therein lies the imbalance (or opportunity, depending on one's point of view).
[Vol. 19:3
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stitute of Space Law. 4
One issue was the use of certain terms pertaining to arms control provi-
sions of space agreements. Do 'weapons of mass destruction,' for example,
include other than atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons?
What was the meaning of "mass" - 1,500, 10,000 or more people? Were
ASATs, lasers, or solar energy, weapons of mass destruction?
One answer might be that what constituted a weapon of mass destruction
depended on the meaning attributed to the word 'mass' and the capability
of a weapon to destroy such mass. While the precise quantity of a mass
had not been determined, presumably weapons having destructive effects
similar to ABC weapons could be included if the actual mass capable of
being destroyed by a particular weapon met the definition.
The proposed answer, however, defines the term "mass destruction" as
that which occurs when a mass is destroyed, and as Professor Gorove points
out, no definition of a mass is available. Even if clear definitions for the
English language terms such as "mass destruction," "weapon," and so forth
were developed, they still would have to be translated into various other
languages, thereby bringing about the same problem again, but in a different
language. The above problem results from and/or gives rise to a certain
amount of intentional vagueness in treaties. Another reason for imprecise
terms is the ever present disagreement among the contracting parties as to
specific treaty provisions. A well placed ambiguous word can work wonders in
resolving an impasse. Vague treaty language, however, has a more sinister ef-
fect in that it can encourage noncompliance with the intent of the treaty. If a
term cannot be defined with precision, then it is difficult to prove that a viola-
tion of a treaty provision controlled by that term is taking place. This can have
serious consequences when the term is "weapon" or "peaceful uses."
The purpose of revisiting the well known shortcomings of agreements
such as the Outer Space Treaty is to highlight the facts that vague language is
endemic to arms control treaties, is often intended, and can help facilitate the
intentional or negligent noncompliance with treaty provisions. More impor-
tantly, too much effort is expended in attempting to solve what may be an in-
soluble problem: establishing precise definitions for treaty language which
probably was intended to be vague in the first place.
Beware the False Analogy.
When confronted with a new and uncharted field of law, scholars logical-
ly draw upon similar experiences in the past and use these analogies to help de-
fine the future course which the law should take in a given field. In space law,
'Comments by Professor Stephen Gorove, Chairman of the panel on Arms Control in Outer Space, held
April 23, 1982, and published in the Proceedings of the 76th Annual Meeting of the American Society of In-
ternational Law, at 284-85.
Winter, 19861
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the analogies generally are of a territorial nature. The territory of space is com-
pared to the high seas, Antarctica and other transnational regions on earth.
For example, four authors refer to the Antarctic analogy in submitting papers
under the topic "Conditions Essential for Maintaining Space for Peaceful Pur-
poses" at the 27th Colloquium in Lausanne, while six papers invoke the Moon
Treaty analogy.'" This demonstrates the extent to which analogies are utilized
in discussing laws affecting certain activities in outer space.
Danger exists in overreliance upon analogies. Noted authors have advised
caution in applying the maritime analogy to space law.'" Analogizing in the
area of space weaponization is an especially tenuous proposition. Arguing that
all weapons must be banned from space because they presently are banned
from the moon 7 and Antarctica overlooks one essential point. The moon and
Antarctica have virtually no military value in preventing or conducting a con-
flict between the two superpowers. No strategic or tactical military disadvan-
tage results from banning all weapons from the moon or Antarctica. There is
little activity of military importance that could be done from the moon which
could not be done faster and as efficiently from earth orbit, at least until such
time as there are essential national assets on the moon to protect. Likewise,
Antarctica (presently) is of little military value, 9 since a military conflict be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union primarily would be limited to
the northern hemisphere, albeit with disastrous worldwide consequences.
Manned bombers and ICBMs (but not necessarily FOBS)20 must fly north from
both the United States and the Soviet Union to reach their targets. Nations ef-
fectively have banned weapons from international regions which are not
strategically important. The same cannot be said of areas which are strategical-
SAs to the Antarctica analogy, see papers submitted by authors Bruhacs, Dekanozov, Kotlyarov, and Wulf.
As to the Moon Treaty analogy for the deweaponization of outer space, see papers submitted by authors
Bruhacs, Christol, Dekanozov, Kopal, Piradov and Maiorsky, and He Qizhi.
"Diederiks-Verschoor, Introduction to the Legal Aspects of Inhabited Space Stations. 7 HASTINGS INT'L. &
COMP. L. REV.. 479, 480 (1984); Gorbiel, Orbiting Inhabited Space Stations: Selected International Legal
Aspects, 7 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 509, 518 (1984).
"Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 34 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 20), U.N. Doc. A/3420 (1979).
'"See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4.
19 Although the IAntarctic Treaty) analogy is inexact, or even largely inappropriate, until the nations
come to believe that space and the celestial bodies are as strategically unimportant as the Antarctic
continent, the treaty regime needs some mention, in part because of the frequent use of its terms as a
model for outer space.
S.H. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD. THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 61(1970); see also Note,
Final Frontier: A Regime to Govern the Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEo. L.J. 1427,
1449-50 (1983). The discovery of natural resources in Antarctica and continuing efforts by certain nations to
perfect their Antarctic claims promise to increase tensions when the present Antarctic Treaty is reevaluated
at the end of this decade.
'The Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) is a Soviet weapons delivery system by which
warheads can be launched into space to complete a partial orbit before being directed toward their targets.
As a practical result of FOBS, the Soviets have the ability to strike targets within the United States from
other than a northerly direction, thus complicating missile detection efforts. The Soviets tested FOBS from
1967-1971. The United States has no similar system. Reed & Norris, supra note 2, at 670.
[Vol. 19:3
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ly critical, such as earth orbit2' and the high seas.2" As a result, the analogies ac-
tually argue against a comprehensive ban on all weapons from space, notwith-
standing the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and the Moon Treaty.
The Disarmament - Conflict Spectrum.
Complete disarmament is by no means the only way to achieve national
security. This is well demonstrated by the fact that there has been no super-
power disarmament and no superpower war for over 40 years. The existence of
weapons need not lead to war and the ironic concept of MAD is that the ex-
istence of nuclear weapons leads to peace. As a result, the argument that we
must ban weapons in space to preserve peace in space is not supported by the
experience of the last four decades.
Alternatives to disarmament do exist. Assuming that total disarmament is
at one end of the spectrum and that war is at the other end of the spectrum, at
least two identifiable alternatives exist between these poles. One point along
the continuum is arms control and another is arms cooperation. Three of these
four alternatives are discussed below.
(1) Disarmament.
Placing disarmament at the opposite end of the spectrum from war makes
the questionable assumption that disarmament necessarily will lead to peace.
Since mankind historically has been a warlike animal, there is little data
available to support or refute the claim that disarmament would bring about
peace. One great advantage of disarmament is that it would make subsequent
conflicts, if any developed, less violent and destructive. This must be balanced
against the potentially severe consequences should one nation or organization
renege on a disarmament agreement. Aside from these somewhat
philosophical considerations, the greatest flaw of disarmament is that it is not
practical. The well worn expression that "the genie is out of the bottle" unfor-
tunately is an apt description. Not only is the nuclear genie out of the bottle,
but so too is the space weaponization genie. Space weapons have been de-
signed, built and tested; and there may be no more realistic chance for space
disarmament than there is for a terrestrial disarmament.
(2) Arms Control
Since nations have failed at, or refused to attempt, disarmament, they
devote their attention to arms control. Arms control is a limited and piecemeal
form of disarmament, i.e., disarmament as to some specific place or a limita-
2 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4.
22One example of language which neither deweaponizes nor demilitarizes the high seas is found in Article
141 of the Third U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides: "The Area shall be open to use ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes by all States, whether coastal or land-locked, without discrimination and
without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part." A/Conf. 62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982).
Winter, 19861
9
March: Strategic Defense Initiative
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
tion on some type of weapon system. Occasionally, arms control efforts have
had an impact by resulting in a treaty or other agreement. However, these
limited arms control successes have not stopped the trend; and the trend is the
most massive peacetime military build up by any two nations in the history of
the world. Arms control agreements are products of the competition between
the superpowers for national security and preeminence. The dominant factor
in superpower relations has been competition; and arms control efforts become
less significant when one considers the overall trend.
(3) Arms Cooperation.
Another rational position along the spectrum is arms cooperation. (The ir-
rational alternative of war will not be considered.) Arms cooperation is the
situation in which the superpowers work in collaboration toward the enhance-
ment of mutual security. Stated differently, the superpowers engage in open
and affirmative steps which contribute to the prevention of conflict. Instead of
agreeing to refrain from some act, the superpowers agree to perform certain
verifiable activities. Examples of arms cooperation do exist and more have
been proposed. One concrete example is the Agreement on Measures to
Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War.23 This bilateral agreement be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union calls for affirmative steps to
guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; creates a
duty to notify the other party as to incidents involving a possible detonation of
a nuclear weapon; and requires notification of missile launches which will ex-
tend beyond national borders.
A proposal also has been made to establish "nuclear risk reduction cen-
ters" in Moscow and Washington." The centers would be staffed by personnel
of the host country, but liaison officers of the other side would be permitted
some degree of access. The centers would seek to prevent and minimize the ef-
fects of nuclear incidents through close communications and cooperation be-
tween diplomatic and military personnel of the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Arms cooperation between the superpowers is analogous to the more
prevalent examples of joint efforts in space exploration and exploitation. In
1979, American astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts met in space as part of the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. Other less well-known but more scientifically
23Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, United States-U.S.S.R., 24 U.S.T. 1478;
T.I.A.S. No. 7654. The United States and the Soviet Union reaffirmed and broadened this treaty recently by
agreeing to notify each other in the event of a nuclear explosion or threat by a third party. This is significant
in that it is a departure from the dogmatic superpower preoccupation with one another and signifies a grow-
ing awareness of possible threats which may emanate from nonsuperpowers. U.S. and Russia Agree on One
Nuclear Issue. San Fran. Chron., July 6, 1985, at I, col. 4.
2 A Proposal to Reduce Risk of Nuclear War. San Fran. Chron., Sept. 16, 1985, at 8, col. 5.
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rewarding projects followed in a wide range of fields.2"
These examples show that the Soviet Union and the United States can
cooperate in military affairs and space affairs. The same should be true with
respect to space weaponization. Arms cooperation is a means by which the
Soviet Union and the United States can learn more about each other and cease
a costly arms race. It is a practical concept in that it can enhance the prospects
of peace without threatening entrenched military interests. Instead of com-
peting for security, the superpowers could just as well cooperate for security.
III. APPLYING THE INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK To THE SDI DEBATE
The section will apply the seven factor framework discussed previously in
the general context of arms control agreements to the specific debate surround-
ing SDI. It should be stressed that SDI is a research program only. No actual
decisions have been made as to the basing mode or method of operation. To en-
sure that some commonality of understanding exists in using the term SDI, a
few words are in order.26
The SDI defense would provide the United States with a means of
destroying ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It must
be understood that, at present, the United States possesses no antiballistic
missiles, nor any other defensive weapon system capable of stopping even one
hostile missile. Some of the presently envisioned SDI systems would be unable
to destroy enemy bombers or cruise missiles due to the low altitudes at which
these delivery systems operate. Their low altitude provides them with a thick,
shielding layer of atmosphere which dissipates the effects of the spaceborne
SDI equipment. Whether SDI could destroy intermediate range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs) or tactical missiles is another gray area at present. Thus, SDI
would not render nuclear war impossible. Instead, it is intended only to remove
the primary threat posed by strategic missiles.
SDI could be, for example, an unmanned spaceborne weapon system com-
prised of "layers" of satellites operating in earth orbit.27 Each satellite could be
capable of destroying several missiles during the boost phase, coast phase, or
terminal portion of the missiles' course, but preferably prior to the time that
the missiles release reentry vehicles (RVs) containing the nuclear warheads.
RVs are small, hardened targets difficult to destroy, as opposed to a relatively
slow moving ICBM in upward flight. The specific method by which SDI might
destroy missiles is an ongoing debate. Leading proposals are the kinetic-kill
25For detailed reviews of Soviet-American space cooperation agreements and projects, see Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space (1985); Friedman & Sagan, US/USSR Coopera-
tion in Exploring the Solar System (1985) [an internal report of the Planetary Society].
"The following two paragraphs have been reprinted with minor modifications from March, The Strategic
Defense Initiative: Looking Beyond MAD, I J. ASTROLAW 4-5 (1985). A copy of this issue of the J. O-
ASTROLAW is on file with the AKRON LAW REVIEW.
2 U.S. Explains How Star Wars Would Work, San Fran. Chron.. Nov. 4. 1985, at I, col. 5.
Winter, 19861
11
March: Strategic Defense Initiative
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
method and directed energy method. 8 The kinetic-kill method includes metal
objects fired at or exploded near the missile. The directed energy method in-
cludes particle beams and lasers fired at the target. In either case, an object or
energy would be directed by an orbiting satellite toward a hostile missile.
SDI Must Be Considered as Part of the Overall Military Balance.
SDI, if ever deployed, would be an integral part of United States strategic
forces and would have a direct impact on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. military balance.
For these reasons, the SDI debate cannot be artificially separated from the
overall arms control and arms cooperation debates merely because it operates
in space and not on the ground. Placing the SDI weapons platform in space is
indicative of the military's historical preoccupation with taking the high
ground. Academicians, in reiterating the legal distinction between earth and
space, are in direct competition with the military planners who relentlessly
compete for every advantage over a potential adversary. Given the relative
positions of academicians and military planners in both the Soviet Union and
the United States, the prospect for expecting a comprehensive ban on all space
weaponry appears remote.
It is difficult to support the claim that a nation should not be permitted to
better deter against or defend itself from an attack from space. SDI is a non-
nuclear defensive system designed to intercept an ICBM/SLBM attack; an at-
tack from space. Space arms control advocates already have failed in the Outer
Space Treaty to ban the primary threat to peace from space, the ICBM, since
ICBMs are not orbital weapons of mass destruction. Now efforts have turned
to banning the defensive answer to the offensive problem which was left
unresolved by the Outer Space Treaty.
Interrelationship of International Law, MAD and SDI.
The few arms control treaties which exist to date have endorsed and
codified the policies of MAD.29 This is somewhat curious in that arms control
treaties and MAD have the same goal, but seemingly inconsistent methods.
Both seek to prevent conflict, but arms control treaties limit the quality and
quantity of weapons, while MAD dictates that the capability of mutual
assured destruction, i.e., efficient offensive weapons guaranteed to work, must
exist and remain unthreatened. Under MAD, the germane question is whether
SDI would contribute to or detract from mutual deterrence.
On the "pro SDI" side of the debate is the fact that a SDI system would
have a great deterrent effect since it increases uncertainty in planning a
preemptive strike. An attacker would not know which of its missiles would
2HId.
2
,eesupra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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reach their targets. Therefore, SDI need not be 100% effective to be a strong
deterrent. SDI also would be of a non-nuclear defensive nature, must necessari-
ly be a cheaper deterrent than offensive systems,' and would employ destruc-
tive force only against offensive military targets operating in or near space. On
the "con" side are destabilizing effects of SDI, since the effectiveness of offen-
sive missiles is called into question. Other "con" factors include cost,
technological feasibility, and the possibility of a new round, albeit defensive, in
the arms race. It also is argued that SDI would "extend the arms race into
outer space," but this is a somewhat specious argument since the present global
mutual hostage situation of MAD respects no geographical borders and makes
no legal status distinctions between earth and space. Space already is the
primary medium of mass destruction and stationing weapons in space does not
alter this fact.
The above pro and con arguments of SDI effects on MAD assume that
MAD will remain a viable strategic policy well into the future. This is far from
certain. The "M" in MAD stands for "mutual," i.e., bilateral interaction be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. This two superpower situation
is eroding rapidly due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery
systems throughout the world.31 The People's Republic of China, Great Brit-
ain, France and India are included in the nuclear club." Various other nations,
some headed by dictators-for-life or martyrs-to-be, eventually will have the
ability to threaten both Washington and Moscow with instant annihilation. As
a result, Mutual Assured Destruction will be replaced by the even more
ominous situation of "Multiple Assured Destruction," in which various
alliances and individual states attempt to deter one another from initiating a
nuclear attack. Leaving one's cities open to attack in such a situation would be
a reckless course of action which only can be prevented by a defensive system.
With or without MAD, SDI would provide a nuclear shield against ac-
cidental or unauthorized launch of a missile by any party. The warning provid-
ed under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral agreement33 of such an incident is of little
use without a means to destroy the errant missile. United States' missiles can-
not be recalled following launch and, presumably, neither can those of the
Soviet Union. In 1979, and twice again in June of 1980, United States strategic
forces were placed at a high state of readiness due to computer errors at the
United States Air Force Cheyenne Mountain complex. These situations pro-
"'A strategic defense system must be survivable and cheaper than offensive countermeasures. If not, it would
promote an offensive weapons build-up. Talbott, Upsetting a Delicate Balance. TIMI-. March II, 1985, at 17.
3 Nuclear Proliferation Worsening. Report Says. San Fran. Chron., Nov. 29, 1985, at 32, col. I. The in-
crease in the proliferation of nuclear weapon-grade material and technology is even more ominous when one
considers the simultaneous increase in terrorist activity. See Increase in Terrorism Forecast for Year 2000.
San Fran. Exam., Dec. I, 1985, at A-17, col. I.
32Perlman, The Clouds Covering the Nonproliferation Treaty, San Fran. Chron., Aug. 28, 1985, at AI, col.
3 See supra note 23.
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vided the author with first-hand experience concerning certain shortcomings
of offensive nuclear weapons technology and operating procedures .3  The
Soviet Union also has had its share of mishaps in handling weapon systems. In
January, 1985, an apparently unarmed Soviet naval cruise or target drone
missile was fired accidentally toward Norwegian territory and subsequently
crashed in Finland. 5 Such an episode must not be repeated with an armed
ICBM. SDI would have the capability to destroy errantly launched nuclear-
tipped ICBMs and SLBMs.
Assuming MAD remains an accepted policy in the future, the pertinent
issue is whether SDI-type systems of the United States and the Soviet Union
would enhance or detract from deterrence. More importantly, the usefulness
of SDI-type systems must be considered in light of the fact that MAD soon
may be an unacceptably reckless policy in a world full of nuclear weapon-
possessing leaders having various degrees of rationality.
SDI and International Law Fora.
To many observers, 36 the central issue which must be addressed in apply-
ing existing international law agreements to the SDI debate is the effect of the
ABM Treaty upon SDI deployment. Suffice it to say that the Reagan Ad-
ministration has tendered some tenuous arguments explaining why it believes
that SDI would not violate the spirit of the ABM Treaty. As the cited
observers properly point out, the whole issue could be dissipated by the stroke
of a pen should the United States choose to abrogate the Treaty as provided in
Article XV.3 7 This, of course, would create a tremendous propaganda oppor-
tunity for the Soviet Union, and favorable propaganda is the initial objective
which is presently sought in international law fora with respect to SDI.
The superpower competition in space weaponry is more exemplified than
regulated by the international law-making process. The SDI research program,
which could not possibly lead to an operational antimissile capability for at
least a decade, is not seen so much as a national security threat by the Soviet
'On both occasions in 1980, the author was serving as commander of a Minuteman ICBM complex near
Minot, North Dakota, at the time of the false alarms. These incidents help demonstrate that human and
machine error can occur in missile operations. Having been well trained for such contingencies, however,
the situation was not critical and built-in procedural safeguards worked as planned to prevent an unwar-
ranted launch of missiles.
"Soviet Missile Over Norway, San Fran. Chron., January 3, 1985, at I, col. 6.
Smith, supra note I, at 59-68; Meredith, The Legality of a High- Technology Missile Defense System: The
ABM and Outer Space Treaties, 78 AM. J. INTL. LAW 418 (1984); Note, Star Wars Meets the ABM Treaty:
The Treaty Termination Controversy, 10 N.C.J. INTL L. & COM. RE 701 (1985).
"The termination provision of the ABM Treaty, supra note 7, provides in part:
Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if
it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interest. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal
from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interest.
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Union as it is an opportunity to lambast the United States in international fora.
The Soviet Union's rhetoric that space must be free of weapons should be tem-
pered by the facts that the Soviet Union pioneered the military uses of space38
and has had its own sophisticated antiballistic missile program for years.39
When the Soviet spaceborne ballistic missile defense program begins to bear
fruit, the propaganda opportunity will diminish. At that point, realistic and ra-
tional debate can commence between the superpowers, most likely in a bilater-
al setting, as to what type of SDI treaty is practicable. Just as the Soviet Union
scored propaganda points in international law-making fora with the perceived
military uses of the Space Shuttle (before testing its own shuttle prototype and
softening its anti-Space Shuttle rhetoric), so too will the Soviets play out the
SDI propaganda opportunity before settling down to meaningful debate.
The SDI Media Theater.
International law fora are not the only theaters in which propaganda op-
portunities exist. Other important propaganda avenues include the highly com-
petitive and largely unregulated Western press. The Soviet Union stands to
gain much more by influencing the Western press and public concerning the
SDI debate than it does by arguing in legal and academic circles, since negative
public opinion or a change of Administrations in the United States can end
SDI research more quickly than any negotiated agreement. An obvious im-
balance exists since the Western press invites and publishes diverse opinions on
SDI, while views in opposition to Soviet state policy are not permitted to be
aired in the Soviet state-controlled media. This was especially evident during
the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, when Soviet representatives appeared
on all three major television networks in the United States "to offer official
wisdom on topics ranging from ICBMs to Soviet Jews."'  By comparison,
President Reagan's picture appeared on page 1 of Pravda for the first time in
his presidency during the Summit.4' Attempts to manipulate and/or benefit
from public opinion are factors only in the West; for only in the West can
public opinion halt military research and development.
The Reagan Administration has easy access to the United States press in
-"Sputnik I established the precedent of "outer space overflight" and was launched by a military launch vehi-
cle. clearly demonstrating a global nuclear strike capability. The Soviets reaffirmed this capability by testing
FOBS. See supra note 20. The Soviet Union also has the only operational ASAT capability lat the time of
this writing) and the world's only operational ABM system.
"+Aside from a ground-based ABM system near Moscow, the Soviets have aggressively pursued other
ballistic missile defense programs, some of which are claimed by the United States to be in violation of the
ABM Treaty. For example, the SA- 12 surface-to-air missile has apparent ABM capability. In addition, the
Soviet phased-array tracking radar near Krasnoyarsk also violates the ABM Treaty according to the United
States. Reagan: Soviets Cheating, San Fran. Exam., Dec. 22, 1985, at A- 16, col. I: see also United States
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, SDI: The Soviet Program 119851 Itext of address by Paul
Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters. before the
Chautauqua Conference on Soviet-American Relations, Chautauqua, New York, June 28. 1985.1
"'Kelly. Filling Up the Empty Hours. TIMI:. December 2. 1985, at 36.
"How It Playedin PRAVDA. Tim. December 2, 1985, at 36.
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pushing for its SDI program, but a significant amount of coverage has been
given to persons outside of the Warsaw Pact who oppose SDI as well. For ex-
ample, one group of scientists has received much attention for espousing the
view that a workable SDI system is technologically impossible to build and is
not in the interests of world peace.42 A panel of arms control experts, including
members of the Reagan Administration, also advised sharp cuts in SDI re-
search.43 Even two former secretaries of defense have criticized SDI openly in
the press." Despite this, 1985 polls have shown that the majority of United
States citizens who have followed the SDI debate support the research
project."
The SDI media theater within the United States has had mixed results,
but one unfortunate general effect is that the impassioned media debate has
tended to polarize issues instead of facilitating educated discussion. The exten-
sive media coverage also will help intensify future congressional battles over
SDI long before the two superpowers could ever hope to reach the stage of SDI
negotiations. The opponents of SDI in Congress and in subsequent administra-
tions will force various compromises and cutbacks in SDI research. If United
States and Soviet negotiators ever meet in the future to attempt to draft a SDI
treaty, SDI will be a vastly different program from that now envisioned by the
current Administration. However, public opinion cuts both ways. Assuming
that some SDI agreement eventually is negotiated between the superpowers,
public and congressional opinion could prevent ratification, as was the case
with SALT II following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Public opinion and the power of the free press are volatile tools which af-
fect only one side of the SDI debate. More importantly, propaganda should not
be confused with actual superpower positions.46 When the hollow rhetoric
2700Scientists Oppose Work on Star Wars, San Fran. Chron., May 31, 1985, at 28, col. I: butseeFossedal,
Star Wars and Scientists, Wall St. J., June 14, 1985, at 24, col. 3, who argues that many anti-SDI scientists
are engaging in political debate, not scientific analysis: "Of course, when one says 'scientists,' one means
chiefly theoretical physicists at MIT or Cornell. The typical Boeing engineer or applied-electronics man in
Silicon Valley - who probably has more expertise in this area than, say. Carl Sagan - supported Star Wars
all along." (quoting James Fletcher.)
"Perlman, Arms Experts Urge Cutback in Star Wars, San Fran. Chron., March 15, 1985, at I, col. 5.
"Ex-Defense Chiefs Veto Star Wars, San Fran. Exam., May 2, 1985, at A-20, col. 1.
"
5Majority in Poll Backs "Star Wars" Weapons, San Fran. Chron., February 25, 1985, at I, col. 4: Gersten-
zang, Public Backs "Star Wars, "1Hopes for Arms Control. L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
'The distinction between a stance for propaganda purposes and an actual bargaining position was explained
well by former Soviet leader Khrushchev in a conversation with Soviet diplomat (turned defector) Arkady
N. Shevchenko:
'Never forget the appeal that the idea of disarmament has in the outside world. All you have to do is
say, "I am in favor of it," and that pays big dividends.' Admitting with a grin that he neither expected
the West to disarm completely nor contemplated such a course of action for the Soviet Union,
[Khrushchev] added, 'a seductive slogan is a most powerful political instrument. The Americans don't
understand that they only hurt themselves in struggling against the idea of general and complete
disarmament. What they are doing is as futile as Don Quixote's fighting the windmills.
A. SHEVCHENKO. BREAKING WITH MOSCOW 101-02 (1985).
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ceases, meaningful negotiations may commence.
Problems Inherent in Attempting to Draft a Treaty Banning SDIfrom Space.
Should a treaty banning SDI from space be signed, problems in its inter-
pretation most likely will be similar to those which for many years have sur-
rounded the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. This certainly does not
mean that the nations will forego the perceived benefits of an SDI agreement
simply because imprecise language could exist. Instead, the drafters might
draw from the experience provided by these two previous treaties in an-
ticipating specific problems which eventually may arise under an SDI treaty.
Classic definitional problems of space law will affect any SDI treaty. An
agreement to ban a spaceborne ABM system depends upon the definition of
"outer space."47 A clear, concise definition has eluded scholars for years and
future technology will only confound the situation. The Space Shuttle was one
of the first steps in the technological blurring of the airspace/outer space
demarcation line.48 The United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
presently is studying concepts for a transatmospheric vehicle which could take
off and land like an aircraft, yet operate in space as a weapons-carrying plat-
form.49 Such a vehicle eventually could diminish the need to place SDI hard-
ware permanently in orbit and, thus, could circumvent a ban on space based
SDI systems. Likewise, one SDI proposal calls only for the placement of mir-
rors in orbit which would direct energy originating from earth toward a
target.5 0 This raises a second longstanding space law issue: What constitutes a
weapon? Would an orbiting mirror which directs a laser beam at ICBMs be
considered a weapon or even a weapon of mass destruction?
It also should be reiterated that SDI primarily is a research program. It
would be virtually impossible to verify a ban on SDI research. A research ban
was not attempted in the ABM Treaty and the Soviet Union has acknowledged
the futility of attempting to prohibit SDI research for similar reasons." A SDI
treaty could only pertain to operational testing and deployment.
If political and national security factors do permit meaningful SDI talks
following the current "propaganda stage," negotiators will be confronted with
the same unresolved space law questions, but in a new technological setting.
SDI research cannot be limited by treaty and instead is primarily dependent
upon domestic political and funding considerations. If SDI research eventually
11S.H. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD. THE LAW RELATING TO ACrVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 36-51 (1970).
4Sloup, The NASA Space Shuttle and Other Aerospace Vehicles: A Primer for Lawyers on Legal
Characterization, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L. REV. 403, 435-52 (1978).
"Canan, Space Plan 2000, A.F. MAG.. July, 1985, at 70-73.
5uB. BOVA, ASSURED SURVIVAL 118-19 (1984).
"Russia May Alter Stance on "Star Wars"Research, San Fran. Chron., July 9, 1985, at 8, col. 4. At the time
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does lead to an operational capability, the system need not be positioned per-
manently in space and this could circumvent a weapons ban in space. Such a
system, whether ground based or spaceborne, might be banned by the ABM
Treaty, but only if the signatories choose to keep the treaty in force; a decision
which ultimately will be dictated by national security needs.
A Proposed Analogy for the SDI Debate.
The locational approach to the SDI debate, in which outer space is com-
pared to the high seas or Antarctica, has serious drawbacks. The distinction
between earth and space, assuming a line can be drawn, has much less mean-
ing for national security purposes than it does for legal purposes. Past ex-
perience shows that nations have been unsuccessful in prohibiting weapons
from areas of strategic importance and space is the most strategically advan-
tageous location which exists. A locational analogy also fails because SDI need
not be based in space, so a treaty banning weapons in space may not prohibit
SDI. A better type of analogy for SDI is the weapon system approach. Stated
differently, the SDI debate should be compared to another recent debate on a
specific weapon system intended for use in space; the ASAT. The ASAT exam-
ple is analogous to SDI in the following ways:
(1) Both SDI and ASAT are specific purpose weapon systems designed
for use in space. Whether or not the weapon is "stored" in space before actual
use is of some military importance, but of great political importance.
(2) The two superpowers have ongoing programs both in SDI-type
systems and ASATs. These programs are at different stages of development,
thus creating an imbalance which works against the conclusion of a treaty.
(3) Each weapon system has been the subject of well orchestrated pro-
paganda battles waged in the Western press.
(4) With regard to the United States ASAT and SDI programs, the real
limiting factors at the initial stages will be congressionally imposed and will not
result from a U.S.-U.S.S.R. or multilateral treaty.
The factors cited above are the issues which must be addressed as part of
SDI talks. The key factor will not be the physical location of the equipment. By
focusing only on the basing mode of SDI, misleading territorial analogies
become tempting and the proper focus of debate is lost.
SDI as a Means of Arms Cooperation.
Arms cooperation in the field of strategic missile defense between the
United States and Soviet Union provides a realistic alternative to the placing of
all reliance on arms control efforts as the means to ensure that outer space will
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The example of ASAT shows that
arms control efforts often leave a great deal to be desired. Bilateral cooperation
[Vol. 19:3
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akr nlawreview/vol19/iss3/1
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
in the area of SDI-type systems could be effective because it would call for af-
firmative, verifiable steps taken by both nations to strengthen, not bargain
away, national defense capability.
SDI arms cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union
might work in the following manner. Both nations would continue their
research into spaceborne ballistic missile defense systems, since no agreement
preventing such classified research could be verified. Concurrent with these
research programs would be dialogue on finding a replacement for MAD. Both
nations obviously acknowledge the present MAD policy, since they have built
powerful retaliatory forces, yet have left their cities open to attack pursuant to
the ABM Treaty. A central theme in this MAD-replacement discussion should
be an analysis of the shortcomings of MAD in a multipolar nuclear power
world; a world in which the prospects for nuclear accident and terrorism would
be much higher than at present. Additional benefits of these discussions could
be superpower realizations that (1) both the United States and the Soviet
Union have the unfortunate and hazardous status of being nuclear hostages;
and (2) MAD could be phased out by working to defend cities instead of work-
ing to assure their destruction.
If research into SDI-type systems proves that such a system is feasible, the
United States and the Soviet Union could enter into a SDI deployment treaty.
The deployment treaty could call for the orderly placement of United States
SDI and Soviet ballistic missile defense satellites into pre-selected orbital slots.
Again, such a treaty would be verifiable as the nations would affirmatively act
in a conspicuous manner. As the defense satellites become operational, eco-
nomic and political pressure to retire the decreasingly useful offensive systems
would mount, assuming a cheaper offensive system is not developed to over-
come SDI. It is essential that defensive weapons technology overtake and stay
ahead of offensive weapons technology, in terms of both economy and effec-
tiveness.
Older heavy ICBMs, such as the Titan II and the Soviet SS-18, could be
used to place some of the defensive satellites into orbit. Using offensive missiles
as launch vehicles would accomplish two objectives simultaneously. It would
help build a mutual defense network in space, while reducing the nations' of-
fensive weapons delivery capability. This corresponds to the more general
philosophy behind SDI; a reduction of offensive forces and an increase in
reliance on defensive technology. Utilizing these non-reusable boosters for
peaceful, albeit military, purposes constitutes an affirmative, verifiable means
to reduce their numbers.
The process of using ICBMs to place defensive satellites into orbit has
other more subtle benefits. First, such an agreement to slightly reduce the
missile force of each nation in a relatively productive manner could pave the
way for more extensive agreements in the future, such as expending former
Winter, 19861
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alert force ICBMs to launch purely scientific payloads into outer space. Sec-
ond, it would convince the rest of the world that the superpowers are working
toward replacing MAD with a mutual, rational defense policy.
It should be noted that two other problems exist in the deployment treaty
scenario, aside from the threat of cheaper offensive systems which could flood
the defensive system. The first problem is the instability which would exist as
defensive weapons technology approaches, equals, and begins to surpass offen-
sive weapons technology. This transitional period would be dangerous, since
reliance on the traditional deterrent of offensive systems would be reduced and
eventually replaced by a defensive shield. Once the shield is in place, however,
the constant threat of nuclear strike from space, whether intended or acciden-
tal, whether from superpower or a terrorist nation, would be reduced greatly.
A second problem is the possibility that one defensive shield also could be
used as an offensive weapon to destroy its counterpart. For example, if SDI
could destroy Soviet ICBMs in space, presumably it could destroy the Soviet
defensive satellite fleet as well and render the Soviet Union open to attack,
whereas the United States would continue to be protected by SDI. Such a
preemptive attack could occur in seconds. This problem has been studied in
detail by the World Security Council in San Francisco, which has proposed a
"non-trust" joint operation of SDI-type satellites by the United States and the
Soviet Union. 2 Such a non-trust system would give both nations control over
all satellites, thus preventing a surprise, preemptive strike against the defensive
satellites of any one nation.
Arms cooperation in the form of a deployment treaty would be consistent
with the military philosophy of taking the high ground to enhance national
security. It would also lead to the safer and more sane situation in which defen-
sive weapons technology is superior to offensive weapons technology. In forty
years, adversarial negotiations in the guise of arms control efforts have failed
to deweaponize any strategic area and have failed to end the arms race. Arms
cooperation, on the other hand, has been successful in the few instances in
which it has been attempted. Expanding upon these efforts to deal with the
problem and potential of spaceborne ballistic missile defense could end MAD,
promote defensive systems as opposed to offensive systems, and promote a
non-nuclear means for national defense.
IV. CONCLUSION
Arms cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States is a re-
alistic and practical means by which the peaceful nature of outer space can be
52The purpose of the World Security Council (WSC) is to promote a militarily acceptable agreement prevent-
ing war in space. WSC supports an international coordinated system of interlocking communications




Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss3/1
Winter, 19861 STRATERIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 371
maintained. A proposal to completely deweaponize outer space is psycho-
logically pleasing and has great propaganda value, but it ignores the basic facts
that space is presently the best location from which to defend one's nation, that
space weapons already exist, and that space weaponization is inextricably tied
to earth weaponization. Even if an agreement to deweaponize space were
drafted, verification of this strategically crucial agreement virtually would be
impossible, thereby promoting additional distrust between the superpowers.
Arms cooperation in developing defensive weapons technology would
allow the superpowers to satisfy their national security needs in a more orderly
and controlled way. If both superpowers had an effective and verifiable defen-
sive shield in space, offensive weapons eventually would approach ob-
solescence. Arms cooperation does not rely on superpower trust or altruistic
spirit. Instead, arms cooperation is wholly consistent with the hard realities of
military strategy and national security, factors which heretofore have been in a
strained coexistence with arms control efforts.
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